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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ] 
1ST ROBERT MILLER, 
Defendant-Appellant. ] 
1 Case No. 890459-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is established 
by 78-2a~3(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Judgment, Sentence, Stay of 
Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation and Commitment from the 
Fifth Judicial District Court, Iron County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding. The conviction is for 
distribution of a counterfeit substance, a Second-Degree Felony. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Was there sufficient evidence to convict the Defendant 
of the offense of distribution of a counterfeit substance; is the 
distribution of a counterfeit substance unconstitutional vague. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES 
The provision which is believed to be determinative in 
this matter is 58-37-8(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. This statute is reproduced in total as the addendum to 
this brief. 
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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Judgment, Sentence, Stay of 
Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation and Commitment dated 
June 27, 1989, and signed by the Honorable J. Philip Eves, judge 
of the Fifth Judicial District Court, Iron County, State of Utah. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Defendant was convicted by jury verdict on May 12, 
1989, of the offense of distribution of a counterfeit substance, 
amphetamines or methamphetamines. The Defendant was sentenced to 
serve one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. The 
execution of that sentence was stayed, and the Defendant was 
placed on probation. A condition of probation was that the 
Defendant serve fifteen (15) days in the Iron County Jail, which 
jail-time has been served. The Defendant remains on probation. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The Defendant was convicted of a Second-Degree Felony 
of distribution of a counterfeit substance and placed on 
probation by the trial court for a period of thirty-six (36) 
months. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 21, 1988, a confidential informant working for 
the State of Utah and working with agent Pat McCarthy of the 
State of Utah Narcotics and Liquor Law Enforcement Bureau met 
with the Defendant, Ernest Robert Miller, at the Sportsman's 
Lounge in Cedar City. Mr. Miller is employed at that business by 
his father who owns the lounge. (T.101) The State's agent, 
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Mr. McCarthy, approached Mr. Miller, who was collecting cover 
charges at the front door, and asked Mr. Miller if he "knew any 
body in the bar who could get the informant and myself some 
speed". (T.45) After a period of some minutes, during which 
Mr. Miller danced with the confidential informant accompanying 
agent McCarthy, Mr. Miller told the agent, " I can get you some 
speed, but all I have are some 'crosstops', and they're my own, 
and they are at my house, and I can't get them for you until 
after the bar closes." (T.48) At approximately 1:05 a.m. on July 
21, 1988, the confidential informant, Agent McCarthy, and the 
Defendant left the Sportsman's bar in two vehicles and drove to 
the Defendant's home. (T.49) Inside the home Mr. Miller took 
the informant and the agent into his kitchen, reached up into an 
overhead cupboard, and removed a small cellophane package. (T.50) 
Mr. Miller then gave the package to the informant who gave it to 
agent McCarthy. (T.50) The package contained ten white tablets 
which were perpendicularly scored across the top in a cross 
formation. (T.50) The Defendant informed the agent that there 
was no charge for the tablets. (T.50) He also told the agent 
that he could obtain additional similar tablets at the price of 
$10.00 per 100 or 200 tablets for $20.00. (T.50-51) The 
Defendant also told the agent that the agent would probable have 
to take more than the ten pills in order to get "any type of good 
feeling out of the pills". (T.51) The tablets were later tested 
and found to contain no controlled substances. (T.96) The 
State's chemist, Mr. Kevin Smith, also testified "If there is 
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going to be a controlled substance in a white scored tablet, it's 
going to be amphetimine. In one case, I found a barbiturate in a 
white double-scored tablet, but that's an exception." (T.96) 
Mr. Smith's testing did disclose that the tablets contained 
ephedrine, a mild stimulant, and not a controlled 
substance. (T.96-97) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is insufficient evidence to support a conviction 
of the Defendant in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION 
OF THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE FOR DISTRIBUTION OF A COUNTERFEIT 
SUBSTANCE. 
58-37-2(5), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
defines a counterfeit substance as follows: 
(a) Any substance or container or labeling of any 
substance that without authorization bears the 
trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, 
imprint, number, device, or any likeness of them, of a 
manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser other than the 
person or persons who in fact manufactured, 
distributed, or dispensed the substance which falsely 
purports to be a controlled substance distributed by, 
any other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser; or 
(b) Any substance that is represented to be a 
controlled substance. 
In this particular case, the jury was instructed in 
jury instruction number 10 that, "counterfeit substance means 
any substance that is falsely represented to be a controlled 
substance.If 
In the dealings between the State's agent, Mr. McCarthy 
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and the Defendant, the terms "speed" and "crosstops" were used to 
refer to the items actually given to agent McCarthy. Nowhere in 
the transcript is there any record that the Defendant ever told 
agent McCarthy that he was receiving the controlled substance 
amphetamine or the controlled substance methamphetamine. 
The difficulties faced by the Defendant in a case of 
this nature is the use of slang terms in order to refer to 
specifically defined substances within the controlled substance 
act. The process becomes more complicated when the State's agent 
refers to something with a slang term, and the Defendant refers 
to another slang term. The two may intentionally be speaking 
about totally different substances. The State's agent used the 
term "speed" to mean amphetamines or methamphetamines in this 
case. However, the State's agent himself defines "speed" as "any 
central nervous system stimulant that provides a speeding up of 
certain body functions such as respiration and heart beat." 
(T.45) The State's agent also was familiar with the term 
"crosstops", but stated at one point in the transcript that 
"speed" and "crosstops" are "diametrically opposed terms". The 
issue becomes more clouded when the agent begins to use the term 
"narcotics". It is all too often the case that the term 
"narcotic" is used interchangeably with the statutorily defined 
term of controlled substance. Narcotics are a specific class of 
drug which are either derivatives of opium or manufactured to be 
chemically similar to opium derivatives. The use of narcotics in 
the medical field is basically as a pain reliever.(see Webster's 
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Third New World Dictionary, Unabridged, 1981) This is a 
radically different class of drugs with a substantially different 
effect from the amphetamines and methamphetamines allegedly 
referred to by the Defendant in the case at bar. The difficulty 
in the terminology in this case is further pointed out when the 
Statefs agent defines a controlled substance as "any substance 
that is controlled and scheduled and has a legitimate medical 
purpose, as far as being on a medical schedule. Either Schedule 
One, Schedule Two, and such". (T.77) The mistake made by the 
agent is that the substances listed in Schedule One have no 
accepted medical use whatsoever and are completely prohibited in 
their uses. Schedule One substances include narcotics, 
hallucinogenics, stimulants, and other drugs which have only 
abuse potential and no accepted medical use. 
The use of slang terminology to refer to specifically 
defined controlled controlled substances makes cases of this type 
extremely difficult to analyze. The apparent operative words in 
this case are the words "speed" and "crosstop". The State's 
agent, in testifying, said that the two terms were diametrically 
opposed (T. 63), and that "speed" was any central nervous system 
stimulant (T. 45) while "crosstops" contain ephedrine which is 
not a controlled substance. (T.84) An analysis of the word 
"junk" can point out the difficulties shown in this case. The 
term "junk" is often referred as a description of the controlled 
substance heroin which is a schedule one controlled substance 
under the Utah Controlled Substances Act. However, the term 
6 
"junk" is also referred to as refuse, trash, or garbage. There 
are individuals who are constantly engaged in the business of 
being "junk dealers" who cannot reasonably be deemed to be 
engaged in the false representation of anything as a controlled 
substance. 
The use of the term counterfeit substance in this case 
would apparently give the discretion of defining counterfeit 
substance solely to the agent involved. If the agent asks an 
individual for anything and refers to the item with use of a 
slang term, and the individual responds by giving another item 
also referred to in a slang term, it is only the judgment of the 
State's agent that establishes the parameters of the prescribed 
conduct. Such a broad definition of criminal conduct may be 
constitutionally suspect where criminal conduct may be defined in 
terms of an agent's perception and subjective judgment rather 
than by objective observable fact. 
The facts in this case, however, point out the 
vagueness problems with this statute when one leaves the safe 
realm of the defined controlled substances. The terms "speed" 
and "crosstops" may or may not be the equivalent to "controlled 
substances." In that circumstance, the proscribed conduct can 
only be guessed at by a person of ordinary intelligence standing 
in the position of a reasonable man. 
The writer of this brief cannot find support for a 
constitutional challenge to the statute in question. A recent 
Colorado case, People v. Moore, 674 P.2d 354 (Colo.,1984) upheld 
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the constitutionality of a similar statute, and it is clear that 
there are a large number of factual patterns which would support 
a conviction of distribution of a counterfeit substance under the 
present statutory language. For this reason the Appellant must 
urge upon this Court the argument that the evidence in this case 
is not sufficient to support the jury's verdict. This is perhaps 
the most onerous burden required of a Defendant on appeal. This 
Court is bound to favorably view the jury's verdict and to 
resovle any and all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the 
verdict. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah, 1983); State 
v. Webb, 113 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, July 21, 1989. 
Still, the evidence in this case, when reduced to its 
simplest form will not support, beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
conviction of the Defendant/Appellant. The agent asked for 
"speed" which he defined as any central nervous system stimulant 
and not exclusively a controlled substance. The Defendant gave 
the agent "crosstops" and there was no representation that the 
"crosstops" contained a controlled substance. (T. 85) Neither 
the Defendant nor the State's agent used the words "amphetamine" 
or "methamphetamine". Unfortunatley, the Defendant was convicted 
of distributing a counterfeit substance because he represented 
ephedrine to be "crosstops", whatever that term means. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Defendant/Appellant has been convicted of 
this offense by a jury verdict relying upon insufficient 
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evidence, the Judgment of the trial court should be reversed and 
this Court's order issue to the District Court to dismiss the 
matter, (see State v. Webb, supra.) 
DATED this / Q day of November, 1989. 
JMJES L. SHUMATE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Mr. Paul 
Van Dam, Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114, this f ^ day of November, 1989, first 
class postage fully prepaid. 
9 
ADDENDUM 
58-37-8. P roh ib i t ed ac t s — Pena l t i e s [Effective 
until J u l y 1, lf)<H>J. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is 
unlawful for any person to knowingly and inten-
tionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or 
to possess with intent to produce, manufac-
ture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or ar-
range to distribute a controlled or counter-
feit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the 
course of his business as a sales representa-
tive of a manufacturer or distributor of sub-
stances listed in Schedules II through V ex-
cept under an order or prescription; or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance with intent to distribute. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsec-
tion (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or 
II is guilty of a second degree felony and 
upon a second or subsequent conviction of 
Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree 
felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III 
or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third de-
gree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection 
is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a 
second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third de-
gree felony. 
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